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The contested politics of the Asian atom: A comparative analysis of peripheralisation 
and nuclear power in South Korea and Japan 
 
Introduction 
The nuclear power industry sits at a proverbial crossroads between renewed growth and 
accelerated decline. Heralded by advocates as being one of the few low-carbon electricity 
sources able to meet large-scale escalations in demand for energy services, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency reports that more than 60 countries have formally expressed interest 
in introducing nuclear power to their energy mixes. Meanwhile, traditional markets have 
begun to show some signs of revitalization with nations such as Canada, Japan, and the 
United States all investigating capacity additions or relicensing possibilities. 
However, substantial obstacles related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
financial viability, waste storage, and operational performance—to name a few—continue to 
contend nuclear power’s proclaimed benefits (Sovacool, 2010). As the Fukushima disaster 
illustrates, the technology is susceptible to catastrophic accidents, and adverse repercussions 
can be severe. For many of these reasons, the industry can face staunch resistance from the 
general public when it comes to building additional reactors or nuclear-related facilities.  
Here, we contribute to debates over the future of nuclear power by highlighting a 
socio-political (and thus non-technical or non-economic) dimension often ignored: 
peripheralisation. Writing in Environmental Politics almost 25 years ago, Blowers and Leroy 
(1994) identified how a process of “social peripheralisation” made some communities ideal 
targets for the siting of nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage facilities. According to 
their framework, peripheral communities tend to be (1) remote, (2) economically marginal, 
(3) politically powerless, (4) culturally defensive, and (5) environmentally degraded.  
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 We apply Blowers and Leroy’s framework beyond the UK and beyond only waste 
storage. Drawing from four case studies across South Korea and Japan, and a research design 
involving materials in three languages (English, Korean, and Japanese), our analysis suggests 
that social peripheralisation is both present and persistent. Peripheralisation results from 
insufficient access to information (i.e. the absence of an independent press), social apathy 
stemming from the existence of other priorities (i.e. economic growth aspirations), and even 
misinformation campaigns designed to positively influence public opinion. Furthermore, far 
from being neutral actors, our results strongly question the nature of public involvement. 
Although it may be true that in some cases local activists can stymie a national government’s 
nuclear policy goals through lobbying and protest (Aldrich and Fraser, 2017), we find local 
leaders and even citizens can become arbiters of national policy and can themselves reinforce 
negative peripheral tendencies. Where previous work has suggested that peripheralisation is 
most connected to the more hazardous components of the nuclear fuel cycle such as 
reprocessing or high level waste (Parkhill et al., 2010: 53; Solomon et al., 2010), we find it 
also occurs throughout more mundane elements such as development planning, construction 
of reactors, permitting and siting, operation, fuel processing, and on-site storage. 
To make this case, we first explicate our research design, consisting of case study 
selection and a systematic literature review, before elaborating the specific contours of 
peripheralisation across Ulju and Gyeongju (South Korea) and Futaba and Rokkasho (Japan). 
We discuss how pro-nuclear attitudes become “locked in” so that communities come to 
depend on the very processes that made them peripheral, and conclude that community 
dynamics, subnational struggles, and contests over local power relations may determine the 
future of nuclear power. 
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Background and conceptual approach: disempowerment and peripheralisation  
Discussions regarding social opposition to energy facilities often centre on broader policy 
rationales, “Not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) sentiments or “locally-unwanted-land-use” 
(LULU) situations. Blowers (2010) even writes that nuclear power facilities are a “defining 
example” of LULU facilities. For instance, many insightful studies emphasize how nuclear 
trajectories in Japan and Korea have been shrouded in secrecy, steered by centralized control 
over development, and connected to broader social and political goals such as military security 
or economic development (Jasanoff and Kim, 2009; Yoshioka, 2011; Sovacool and Valentine, 
2012). Other studies show how in some marginal communities, short-term benefits such as 
employment, tax revenue and direct support by governments and utilities can convince people 
to accept nuclear related risks. Shimizu (2011) sees economically vulnerable communities in 
Japan hosting nuclear facilities to capture resources for regional development, a phenomenon 
also observed in Korea (Jang and Lee, 2008). There are therefore numerous claims that siting 
of nuclear facilities is conditioned by dimensions such as land prices, population density, and 
access to water (Lee, 2016; JAIF, 1970).  
These approaches, while they have their strengths, suffer a core weakness in that they 
mainly focus on geographic, demographic, or economic aspects. Blowers and Leroy (1994) 
note that socio-political processes can be just as salient in conditioning where chemical plants, 
power stations, waste disposal facilities, and other major infrastructures are located. Blowers 
and Leroy (1994) and Blowers (1999, 2010, 2017) advance a concept of peripheralisation to 
explain how socially peripheral communities come to adopt LULU infrastructure. Drawing 
primarily from cases involving nuclear waste, their theory suggests that peripheral communities 
tend to be:  
 
The Contested Politics of the Asian Atom 4 
 
• Remote, either geographically separated from population centers or relatively 
inaccessible; 
• Economically marginal, with most communities being homogeneous in terms of the 
social and demographic background and dependent on the nuclear industry as a 
dominant employer; 
• Politically powerless, with most key political decisions being made elsewhere, often 
in metropolitan centers; 
• Culturally defensive, with residents expressing ambivalent or ambiguous attitudes 
towards nuclear energy, combined with feelings of isolation and a fatalistic acceptance 
of nuclear activities; and 
• Environmentally degraded, meaning residents tend to occupy previously polluted 
land or are close to places where radioactive risks are already present. 
 
These five pillars of peripheralisation are tightly intertwined and dynamic. They perpetuate a 
cycle where the siting of an original facility can only intensify the extent of peripheralisation, 
and resultantly invite additional facilities, creating a feedback loop.  
 Peripheralisation theory admittedly draws from, or at least resonates with, diverse 
strands of academic thought. It connects with ecological modernization by suggesting how risk 
and environmental degradation can be minimized (Blowers, 1999); touches on the role of social 
movements, showing how they (and local institutions) can at times be excluded from decision-
making processes (Blowers, 1999); focuses on politics and power relations, especially how 
inequality within and between communities results in uneven patterns of development, as well 
as issues of ethics and democracy, revealing how noxious facilities may be imposed on local 
groups (Blowers, 2010: 10); and overlaps with environmental justice frameworks, emphasizing 
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failures of due process or unequal distribution of costs and benefits in how “rural nuclear towns” 
come to be created (Otsuki, 2016).  
 Despite such synergies, peripheralisation theory still presents a unique perspective that 
at times deepens, and in some cases challenges, other approaches. For instance, tying together 
concepts from ecology, risk analysis, anthropology, and justice, Karlsson (2012) offers a 
powerful portrayal of inequalities that occur during nuclear accidents. A contribution 
peripheralisation makes is that even perfectly functioning nuclear reactors and facilities can 
invoke social or economic damage. Furthermore, rather than occurring as an accidental 
consequence—a misunderstood or chance phenomenon—peripheralisation can become a 
strategy that the nuclear industry uses, pragmatically and intentionally, to influence community 
decisions, indicating where sites are likely to be approved and accepted (Blowers, 2010). In 
addition, instead of emphasizing how national policies and incumbents can shape nuclear power 
processes (Johnstone et al., 2017), peripheralisation offers a multi-actor framework 
underscoring the involvement and orchestration of multiple groups, including local councils, 
trade unions, business associations, electric utilities, national parliamentarians, and even 
international investors. Moreover, it offers context to the “site fights” debates and discussions 
(Aldrich, 2008; Dusinberre and Aldrich, 2011) surrounding nuclear power licensing and public 
participation, showing how they are grounded in deeper, more multi-scalar structures of 
inequality. Also, peripheralisation emphasizes variation in local and national context—for 
instance, nuclear infrastructures in Finland or Sweden do not appear to fit the framework (Nucci 
and Brunnengraber, 2017).  
Finally, the theory demands we think more critically about, and question the desirability 
of, “community” or “local” action. Tolerability to nuclear risk is neither stable nor uniform 
(Parkhill et al., 2010). Zonabend (1993) offers a classic examination of the La Hague nuclear 
waste processing plant in France, demonstrating how patterns of silence and denial can cement 
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unfair development patterns and render local actors impotent. As we will see in our cases, 
however, in Japan and South Korea nuclear activities can be actively propagated by exuberant 
local actors who are far from silent when they advance alluring promises, manipulate public 
opinion, or proclaim their support. Thus, although it appreciates the multiplicity of actors, 
peripheralisation reveals the dynamic and complex nature of local nuclear politics. It confirms, 
as Dunsberry and Alrich (2011: 685) write, that local residents are “not just […] passive 
receivers of government plans but also as active agents in their own right.” Notably, peripheral 
communities are not always powerless, nor is the influence between the periphery and the centre 
unidirectional: communities dependent on the nuclear industry can quickly create an industry 
dependent on particular communities (Blowers, 1999). As Blowers (2010: 163) intimates, “the 
process of peripheralisation, therefore, is one of push and pull, a mutually reinforcing process.”  
 
Research Methods and Design  
As we more rigorously test peripheralisation theory, this section of the paper briefly justifies 
our selection of four case studies in South Korea and Japan. It also explains our primary 
method of data collection, a systematic review of materials in English, Korean, and Japanese.  
 
Case study design  
The qualitative research methodology literature, especially when applied to the fields of 
political science or politics, suggests that case studies can differ in their type, unit of analysis, 
and uniformity (Gerring, 2004; Gerring, 2005; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In that vein, we 
analysed a set of cases as our unit of analysis rather than a single case—leading to 
comparative cross case analysis. Such comparative analysis is ideal for testing or confirming a 
hypothesis and examining causal effects beyond a single instance. In terms of type, we sought 
a combination of typical yet diverse cases. Typical case studies study common, frequently 
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observed, and/or representative cases, and exemplify a stable, cross-case relationship. Diverse 
cases attempt to demonstrate maximum variance along a relevant dimension, so that they 
illuminate the full range of important differences. Our cases are therefore typical but not 
identical, as they vary in some of their features (types of nuclear infrastructure, geographic 
location and proximity to urban areas, local economic structure, etc.). A third methodological 
dimension considered was whether a case (or cross-case comparison) requires temporal or 
spatial variation. We decided spatial variation across different countries was useful as it 
reflected diversity, and that temporal variation across different timeframes was useful to 
permit more natural (less artificial) boundaries around our analysis. Although we examine 
only four cases qualitatively, we maintain that such a “small n” study can still result in “big 
conclusions” (Lieberson, 1991). 
We selected four South Korean and Japanese communities as cases. At the national 
level, both countries exhibit a long history of nuclear development. Table 1 indicates that the 
two countries have six of the top ten largest nuclear sites in the world. Moreover, nuclear 
facilities in both countries involve multiple parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (uranium 
compression, low level of radioactive waste storage, high level of radioactive waste storage, 
reprocessing facilities and mixed oxide fuel manufacturing, to name a few). Operators of 
nuclear facilities in both countries, such as TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company), JNFL 
(Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited) and KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power), therefore have 
established deep connections with the state and local actors. Lastly, both countries are areas 
where the nuclear industry is expected to grow significantly (IAEA, 2017; MOTIE, 2015).  
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Table 1: Ten largest nuclear power sites in the world 
Notes: Figures in parentheses contains under construction facilities.  
Source: Amended from IAEA (2017) 
 
 
Of course, despite these similarities, the two national contexts are not identical (Yun et al., 2010; 
Aldrich, 2010). Valentine and Sovacool (2010) note that in Japan, the country’s industrial 
policy was driven by the elected Liberal Democratic Party, whereas South Korea was a military 
dictatorship during the nascent years of its nuclear program. In Japan, energy policy was 
consolidated at the national level and nuclear electricity generation was initially approved for 
only three utilities, Tokyo, Kansai, and Chubu, whereas in South Korea, the Office of Atomic 
Energy was placed directly under the President and the nuclear program was structured as a 
monopoly under the Korea Electric Power Corporation. More recently, both nations have 
shown distinctive reactions to the Fukushima accident, with it shocking the Japanese system 
but having negligible impact on perceptions in Korea. 
Country Nuclear cluster Number of facilities Capacity (MW) 
Korea Kori 8 (10) 10,452 
Canada Bruce 8 6,700 
Japan Kasiwazaki Kariwa 7 9,096 
Korea Hanul 6 (10) 6,216 
Korea Hanbit 6 6,197 
Korea Wolsung 6  4,809 
China Hongyanhe 6 6,183 
Ukraine Zaporizhzhia 6 6,000 
France Gravelines 6 5,706 
Japan Fukushima Daiichi 6 4,700 
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Within each country, we focus on two separate communities: Ulju district and 
Gyeongju city for Korea, and Futaba district and Rokkasho village for Japan. As Table 2 
summarises, these four regions have at least two nuclear-related facilities (including those that 
are in operation or in the process of being constructed). In Korea, Ulju is home to the Shin 
Kori-3 reactor as well as three others under construction. Gyeongju hosts six reactors as well 
as a radioactive waste disposal facility. In Japan, Futaba is home to the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plants which include reactors and spent fuel facilities. Rokkasho has facilities 
for high level nuclear waste, reprocessing, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication. This selection of 
cases was determined not only by these nuclear facility dynamics, but also availability of data. 
 
Table 2: Summary of four nuclear communities in South Korea and Japan 
 
 
 Korea Japan 
 Ulju Gyeongju Futaba Rokkasho 
Facilities Shin Kori-3 
operating 
reactor and 
4/5/6 under 
construction 
Six nuclear 
reactors and 
Low/middle 
levels of 
radioactive 
disposal facility  
Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plants 
 
Uranium 
enrichment; Low 
and high level of 
nuclear waste 
storage; 
Reprocessing; MOX 
fuel fabrication 
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Capacity 1,400 MW 4809 MW/ 1000 
drums 
4680 MW 1830 canisters of 
high-level 
radioactive waste 
 
Location West of Ulsan 
city 
 
East southern of 
Gyeongsangbuk-
do 
Middle of 
Hama Street in 
Fukushima 
prefecture 
 
Kahoku peninsula in 
Aomori prefecture 
Area 
 
756km2 1324.29km2 865.71km2 252.68km2 
Population 219,201 258,280 65097 11,095 
     
 
Source: Amended from FEPC (2016) and KHNP (2016) 
 
Method of analysis: systematic review 
To assess the extent of peripheralisation in our four cases, our primary method was a systematic 
review. As Petticrew and Roberts (2006: 9) describe:  
 
Systematic reviews are literature reviews that adhere closely to a set of scientific 
methods that explicitly aim to limit systematic error (bias), mainly by attempting to 
identify, appraise and synthesis all relevant studies (of whatever design) in order to 
answer a practical question (or set of questions).  
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In this context, we proceeded to collect more than 800 initial documents published in English, 
Japanese, and Korean (Figure 1). After analysing the material for only those that focused on the 
socio-political, economic, or environmental impacts on communities (positive and negative) 
with the keyword searches summarized in Appendix I, 71 sources were selected for analysis, 
many of which we cite in the paper. Appendix II offers a full list of these sources by location.  
 
Figure 1: Systematic review methodology utilized in this study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
801 Documents identified 
12 ULJU 20 GYEONGJU 18 ROKKASHO 
172 Documents screened 
71 Studies considered 
Rejected 629 literature (Met exclusion criteria) 
 
227 with unreliable data 
402 Facility-focused literature 
Rejected 101 as not relevant to 
community impacts 
21 FUTABA 
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Results and Discussion: The contours of peripheralisation across four cases 
This section presents our results from the systematic review analysis, framed through the 
conceptual lens of peripheralisation. Each case study subsection follows the same structure: a 
brief summary of the nuclear facilities onsite, and then more elaborate historical discussion of 
how peripheralisation has occurred (or continues to occur). Table 3 offers an inductive 
summary of our findings.  
 
Table 3: Summary of social peripheralisation across four case studies  
 
 Korea Japan 
  Ulju  Gyeongju Futaba Rokkasho 
     
Geographical 
remoteness 
On the edge of 
Ulsan city, 
isolated and 
lacking access to 
urban areas 
Relatively well 
equipped 
transportation 
infrastructures 
and accessibility 
to urban areas 
In an isolated 
and 
inaccessible 
region in Japan 
 
Remote, not only 
from the urban 
city, but also from 
the centre of 
Aomori 
prefecture 
 
Economic 
marginality 
Achieved partial 
industrialisation 
but they aim to 
invite further 
Relies on its 
revenue from 
the tourism 
industry, but 
strict regulation 
Agriculture-
based industry, 
pockets of 
extreme 
poverty.  
Agriculture, 
fishery and dairy 
are main 
industries, 
requested poverty 
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industry 
infrastructures 
and national 
industrial policy 
constrain further 
development. 
aid under the 
national 
development 
plan.  
Environmenta
l degradation 
Located next to 
Gijang district, 
which has six 
nuclear reactors, 
they already 
share the risk of 
nuclear 
facilities. 
Has six nuclear 
reactors and 
high-level 
radioactive 
waste within the 
community. 
Home to the 
Daiichi 
Nuclear Power 
Complex, now 
largely 
contaminated 
by the 
Fukushima 
accident. 
Plans to host 
nuclear facilities 
starting with 
Mutsu 
Political 
powerlessness 
Coalition 
between local 
politicians, 
especially the 
governor, and 
national 
government 
strictly discount 
community 
voices. 
 
Local 
government 
subordinated to 
national 
development 
interests  
Close alliance 
between utility 
and local 
politicians  
 
Local voices 
mostly ignored by 
both local and 
national 
governments.  
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Cultural 
acceptance 
Fatalistic 
dependence on 
nuclear related 
facilities. 
Deep-rooted 
sense of 
discrimination 
and financial 
difficulty.  
People to 
regard nuclear 
facilities as a 
part of daily 
life. 
People have 
mostly 
internalized the 
risks of nuclear 
infrastructure.  
 
Source: Authors  
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Ulju town (Korea): Kori nuclear complex 
The Kori nuclear complex, spread across the Kori and Ulju villages, is one of the major nuclear 
clusters in the world. There are six reactors in Gijang district (Kori-1/2/3/4 and Shin Kori-1/2), 
with two more planned for construction, Shin Kori-7/8. There is one operating (Shin Kori-3) 
and three under construction (Shin Kori-4/5/6) in Ulju district. In 2022, when three additional 
reactors are expected to be completed, it could boast 10 GW of capacity.  
The history of the construction of the Kori-1 nuclear power plant can be summarized by 
a single objective of the state: To achieve self-reliance in energy for development. The Kori 
region was chosen as for the nation’s first nuclear power plant due to its remoteness and low 
population (Lee, 2016), and the reactor was completed in April 1978 with a 580 MW capacity. 
Kori has since spawned a nuclear backbone of eight nuclear reactors, meeting the objectives of 
the Fifth Basic Plan of Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand.  
Figure 2: Location of Kori, Shin Kori, Wolsung and Shin Wolsung nuclear power plants 
  
  
Source: KAIF (2017) 
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First, geographic remoteness plays a strong role in the location of nuclear infrastructure. The 
greater Ulju region can be divided into three areas: Western, Middle, and Southern. The 
Western and Middle villages have relatively well-equipped external transport networks, such 
as the KTX (Korean bullet train) and rail infrastructure, which are lacking in the Southern area 
(Ulsan Development Institute, 2014). This ‘internal periphery’ distances Kori from 
‘mainstream’ population centres.  
Second, Ulju shows a degree of political powerlessness, with aggressive protests against 
government plans. For example, people in Seosyneg-meyon collected and submitted a petition 
containing thousands of signatures of local residents against KHNP and the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy (MOTIE). However, it was ignored. KHNP maintained the resolute stance 
that the project would progress, despite local opposition, in order to protect national interests 
(Lee, 2003). When campaigning in 2006, Governor candidate Um ChangSub (subsequent 
Governor of Ulju) affirmed: “It seems impossible to rescind the national-led nuclear projects” 
(Nocut News, 2006).  
Third, the economic marginality of Ulju is reflected in the history of how the facilities 
came to be located. For the people in Ulju, the decision to site the Shin Kori-3 reactor was 
unexpected because it was intended to be built in Hyoam in the Gijang region. However, intense 
local protests in Gijang and an enthusiastic appeal by Park JinGu, then governor of Ulju district, 
convinced national planners to change their minds (Hwang, 1998), and to offer a generous 
compensation package (Han 2012: 60). Local concerns about property prices and deflated land 
values were countered with the passage of the Act on Assistance to Electric Power Plants-
Neighbouring Areas in 2008 (Uslan Press 2007). Due to these accumulating financial benefits 
from the Shin Kori 3 and 4 reactors, Ulju requested two more reactors (Shin Kori 5 and 6) in 
2013. As Park JinGu clarified when explaining the decision, ‘closeness to Kori already means 
we (Ulju) share a certain amount of risk of nuclear energy, so it seems a better choice to host 
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another reactor in our region for economic compensation and regional development’ (Han, 2012: 
60). Following this decision, the community received an estimated ₩910 billion 
(approximately $80 million) from the KHNP, with further regional money promised for 
stimulating regional economic development and constructing infrastructures (Kim, 2016). 
Kong and Lee (2017) estimate that constructing the two reactors will bring the community an 
additional 3,000 jobs and as much as $177 million in infrastructural investments.  
Despite these efforts at reversing the economic marginality of the region, we see the 
entrenchment of patterns of environmental degradation. The continued operation of reactors 
and related facilities have generated thousands of tons of radioactive waste accumulating there, 
as well as thermal pollution from cooling cycles disrupting water quality and flow (Kim and 
Ahn, 2006).  
Finally, the residents of Ulju are culturally defensive and strongly in favour of nuclear 
power as a cornerstone of local growth. This phenomenon was illustrated when President Moon 
JaeIn (temporarily) decided to stop the construction of Shin-Kori 5 and 6. Lee SanDae, head of 
the association of local residents, underscores social acceptance of the ‘nuclear-centred energy 
industry complex’:  
 
Whilst local people intensively opposed the siting of Shin Kori 3 and 4 reactors, it was 
short-lived. Over time, we acknowledged that we cannot make any changes in case of 
Shin Kori 5 and 6 plants, and decided to cooperate with siting. We have accepted as a 
way of life that we must contribute to regional advancement through co-existence with 
the nuclear power facilities. (Lee, 2017) 
 
To borrow from Blowers and Leroy, the community has come to accept, and now reinforces, 
its own peripheralisation.  
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Gyeongju city (Korea): low/middle level of radioactive waste disposal  
Since the national government established its Basic principles for nuclear waste management 
in 1984, there have been numerous attempts to site nuclear waste disposal facilities in Korea, 
Table 4. As a result, Gyeongju was selected in 2005 as the formal permanent site, following a 
favourable local referendum.  
 
Table 4: Historical attempts to site radioactive waste facilities in South Korea  
Period Candidate Sites Result 
1986-1989 Yongil, Ulchin, Yongduck Cancellation by local 
resistance 
 
1990 Anmyondo Cancellation due to media 
leakage 
 
1991-1993 Taean, Youngil, Ulchin, Sanhun, Gosung, 
Yangyang 
 
Aborted due to local 
resistance 
 
1993-1994 Yongsanmyun, Janghun and 
Gisungmyun, Ulchin 
 
Aborted due to local 
resistance 
 
1994-1995 Gulupdo 
 
Discovery of an active fault 
2000-2001 Yeonggwan, Ganjin, Jindo, Gochang, 
Boryeong, Wando, Uljin 
No application 
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Source: Amended from Leam (2015: 175) 
 
In terms of geographic remoteness, Gyeongju lies in the northeast corner of the Korean 
Peninsula, well known as the capital of the Shill dynasty for nearly a century. Because of this 
historical background, it has been called a treasure house of historical and cultural assets in 
Korea. In this sense, Gyeongju relies highly on the tourism industry and related service sectors. 
To manage its historical wealth, the government set strict regulations about urban development 
and planning, such as height and structural limitation for buildings.  
However, these so-called ‘Culture belt’ regulations have restricted economic activity. 
They have been a stringent obstacle for regional development and urban planning for Gyeongju, 
and have given rise to deeply-rooted resentment towards national government, and aspirations 
for self-reliance and local development to overcome regional discrimination (Chae, 2004).  
Taking these regional disparities into account, the then Mayor of Gyeongju, Baek 
SeungJu, announced his intention to host a radioactive waste storage facility in August 2005 to 
secure monetary support from both the national government and KHNP. With three other 
2003 Yongjuck, Ulchil, Yeonggwan and 
Gochang 
 
No application 
2003-2004 Wyudo, Buan Aborted due to local 
resistance and negative local 
referendum 
 
2005 Gyeongju, Gunsan, Yeongdeok and 
Pohang 
Gyeongju is selected as 
official site through the local 
referendum 
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communities also offering invitations—Pohang, Gunsan, and Yeongduk—the siting process 
was seen as competitive and highly desirable. It was even framed in terms of equalizing regional 
economic discrimination. As one resident in Gyeongju stated just after the result of local voting:  
 
Because we failed to invite the Taekwondo Park and racecourse through political 
discrimination, people bonded together not to miss the nuclear waste repository project 
this time. (Kim and Park, 2005) 
 
Gyeongju may very well have viewed hosting the radioactive waste project as a ‘last chance’ 
to escape structural inequality. During the negotiations, the national government even promised 
the ‘boom’ of regional economic growth by committing to reinvesting the benefits from the 
nuclear waste business. These guarantees resulted in a significant improvement of local 
acceptance (Chung and Kim, 2009).  
This approach has produced a number of negative social and environmental community 
impacts, especially after the invitation. For example, the safety of the facility was called into 
question: according the Korean National Assembly in 2013, 74% of the land for the location 
was in ‘faulty’ condition (Nam, 2013: 51-52); construction was postponed several times. In 
September 2016, the largest earthquake in Korean history heightened safety concerns and 
delayed completion to at least 2020. Yun (2006: 27) argues that the government was so 
obsessively absorbed with achieving policy goals and financial inducements that they may have 
neglected safety aspects, even though safety should have been perhaps the primary factor in 
determining the siting of the facility.  
Gyeongju therefore exhibits the presence of multiple dimensions of peripheralisation 
beyond remoteness; economic marginality played a central role in convincing the region to host 
a radioactive waste repository. Facilities at Gyeongju contribute to the local economy through 
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taxation and employment; KHNP and KEPCO KPS account for approximately 10% of regional 
employment (KHNP, 2016: 639).  
In terms of political powerlessness, the siting of the facility illustrates the political 
disparity between centralized and local authority (Cho, 2007). Whilst local voting seems to be 
an advanced and democratic process compared with previous events, it fits into a national 
strategy of ‘self-sustained development’. This strategy proposes that local government 
discovers their own attractiveness or competitiveness and then seeks support from the national 
government. Although based on the principle of decentralisation of power, it can also be 
interpreted as dependence on central government, especially as Gyeongju failed to win two 
other national projects it applied for. Such pressures may have manipulated the community into 
thinking accepting the waste project and committing to further future development was its ‘only 
chance’ for growth (Ha, 2016). As such, Gyeongju and Gyeongsanbuk both have plans to build 
further nuclear facilities such as research institutes (Hwang, 2016). 
Environmental degradation also features prominently. Existing reactors adopted a 
Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) design that produces a larger amount of onsite 
plutonium compared to other designs, exposing Gyeongju to the accumulating risks of nuclear 
waste. Furthermore, the government recently announced plans to add more dry casks for nuclear 
waste from these CANDU reactors as existing capacity is estimated to be exhausted by 2024, 
creating local controversy around environmental safety and stewardship (Lee, 2017). 
Finally, we see cultural defensiveness, and a normalization of risk. In this context, 
Gyeongju might be more attenuated to nuclear waste than any other community in South Korea. 
One local inhabitant even likened the repository to a safely parked car:  
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Radioactive waste repository is the parked car, which seems much safer than running 
one (operating reactor); hence, I cannot understand why people oppose the parked car. 
(Yang, 2016: 141) 
 
Local identity has thus become fused with a proclivity to accept NIMBY and LULU facilities. 
 
Futaba district (Japan): Fukushima nuclear reactors 
The Fukushima region illustrates well the general characteristics of Japanese nuclear 
development and siting. Prior to the March 2011 accident, there were six reactors at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant station (Fukushima 1) and four reactors in the Daini 
cluster (Fukushima 2). As the scale of the cluster shows (Figure 3), Fukushima was claimed to 
be the core of the nation’s Genpatsu Ginza (Nuclear Plaza), and remains one of the largest 
nuclear clusters in the world. 
Figure 3: Location of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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The history of Fukushima is often traced to Kimura Morie, then member of the Japanese House 
of Representatives, who encountered atomic energy at the Helsinki Exposition in August 1955 
(Fukushima Minpo, 2013). Kimura and Sato Kiichi, governor of the Fukushima prefecture, 
subsequently initiated discussions with Kigawada Kazutaka, a Fukushima-native and vice-
president of TEPCO, to build a nuclear project. Kigawada accepted the request, finally deciding 
on the territory bordering the towns of Futaba and Okuma in the mid-1960s. From then on, as 
TEPO put it, “Fukushima expressed a strong willingness to be an industrial city, and also 
presented the blueprint of nuclear plan to us” (TEPCO, 1983). 
In this light, one of the central aspects of peripheralisation, geographic remoteness, was 
seen as an incredible advantage:  
 
220km northward from Tokyo, Fukushima is located almost in the middle of the Pacific; 
it has an area of 320m². The closest household is nearly 1km from the reactor and the 
population rate is low. Naniwa village, which has a population of 23,000, is 8.5km away 
from the reactor. (JAIF, 1970) 
 
Tanaka Kakuei, Prime Minister of Japan in the 1970s, would later even comment that the 
country’s nuclear strategy amounted to: 
 
Build it in rural places instead of Tokyo and send the electricity here. We can send the 
money for it. (Shimizu, 2011: 25) 
 
Its remoteness was therefore an indispensable factor in determining the location of the cluster. 
Equally important is the economic marginalization of the predominantly agricultural Futaba 
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area, with farming accounting for more than 60% of economic activity. Although many local 
people subsisted on agriculture and the fishery industry, Dekasegi (going to other cities for 
work) was a daily routine for many members of the village, especially in the winter. 
Accordingly, TEPCO stressed that nuclear facilities would make the community ‘free from 
Dekasegi’ (Fukushima Minpo, 2013). Nuclear construction was seen as a direct and almost 
immediate antidote to economic backwardness, giving local residents the impression that 
‘Fukushima is becoming the city’ (Fukushima Minpo, 2013).  
In 1974, Three Power Source Development Laws introduced a new tax mechanism for 
nuclear waste, offering additional revenue to nuclear communities and softening remaining 
social opposition (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2010). Via these schemes, Okuma 
experienced significant growth in the 1970s; nuclear-based income constituted 90.7% of total 
local revenue in 1975 (Yamakawa, 1987). The situation in Futaba was similar, with roughly 
half total revenue coming from nuclear assets (Koike, 2013). Nuclear power resulted in 
economic spill-over effects in construction and services, including restaurants, cleaning 
services, and hairdressing (Kono, 2002). For decades afterwards, roughly half of Futaba's total 
revenue came from nuclear assets (Koike, 2013).  
 The entire regional economy consequently became dependent on nuclear infrastructure, 
creating a ‘monoculture’. The nuclear industry provided employment; facilities provided about 
7,000 jobs in the 1980s, and one fifth of local residents work on the nuclear-related occupations 
(Yamakawa, 1987). This shifted the bulk of community attitudes from ambivalence to support. 
Futaba town council argued:  
 
Whilst most local people were surprised and hesitant to accept nuclear development, the 
community's enhanced financial situation changed the atmosphere towards embracing 
it. (Hagami, 2011: 189) 
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Sato Eisaku, former governor of Fukushima between 1988 and 2006, likened this situation 
to ‘drug addiction’ (Koike, 2013).  
 The Futaba example demonstrates the importance of looking beyond individual 
communities when discussing peripheralisation, revealing how the centre (Tokyo, TEPCO, 
bureaucrats) essentially tried to colonize rural areas to maintain their own mass 
consumption lifestyle and power. The electricity from Fukushima and other marginal 
regions was transferred to urban cities, separating and socializing the benefits (clean kWh) 
from the risks (accidents, local pollution). Shimizu (2011: 34) aptly notes that Japanese 
nuclear energy policy therefore typifies a ‘structure of discrimination’ between central and 
marginal areas.  
 
Rokkasho village (Japan): nuclear fuel cycle facilities  
Rokkasho village is located in the northeast peninsula, the so-called Shimokita-hantou 
(Shimokita peninsula) in Aomori prefecture, Japan. As Figure 4 shows, Rokkasho town is 
extremely isolated, not only from Tokyo, but also from the centre of Aomori, which is likely 
why it has become a home for the reprocessing and storage of nuclear waste.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of nuclear facilities in Aomori Prefecture 
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Note: Five facilities in Rokkasho village  
Source: Amended from JNFL (2016) 
 
To provide some context, nuclear power was initially supported with the establishment of the 
First Long-term Plan on Atomic Energy in 1956, which clarified its purpose as ‘producing the 
further amount of fuel by introducing Fast Breeder Reactor, which can achieve the utility of 
Uranium resource, and ultimately improve the vulnerable energy supply structure of Japan’ 
(Atomic Energy Commission, 1956). To this end, the Japan Nuclear Fuel Service (JNFS, 
subsequently Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited) was established as a public corporation in 1980; one 
of its first tasks was to identify suitable land for reprocessing, uranium compression, and low-
level nuclear waste storage.  
Steering this whole process was the Mutsu-ogawara Industrial Development Plan. The 
Plan initially proposed a massive corridor of petro-chemical facilities and steel mills, with 
strong agreement from local residents, in order to combat growing levels of poverty by 
expanding opportunities for employment (Kamata, 2011). However, a lasting consequence of 
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the oil shocks of the 1970s was greatly reduced demand for industrial land and oil-related 
industries. Parallel to this problem, the direction of the government’s economic policy shifted 
to an ‘energy saving and knowledge-based industry.’ An amendment to the Mutsu-ogawara 
Plan therefore seemed inevitable.  
Rokkasho village become attractive as a site because most of the land in the Mutsu-
ogawara industrial region was already secured by public or government-friendly organisations. 
According to a government report, the Mutsu-ogawara region was articulated as having 
‘suitable conditions to be a mecca of nuclear industry’ (Kamata, 2011). Put simply, a perception 
that the region was already environmentally degraded was seen as an encouraging factor for 
siting nuclear facilities there (Shimizu, 1992).  
In these contexts, the plan for nuclear fuel cycle facilities materialised in the mid-1980s. 
In July 1984, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC) requested that 
Aomori prefecture and Rokkasho village build uranium compression and manufacturing 
capabilities, as well as a low level radioactive waste storage and reprocessing facility. In 
January 1985, Rokkasho local council officially signed an agreement to accept both the 
facilities (and waste) in their region. Following this decision, Kitamura Masaya, then governor 
of Aomori prefecture, consented to FEPC’s request, so that both geological and coastal projects 
were initiated in parallel.  
However, a year after the agreement, a historical nuclear disaster happened in Chernobyl 
in 1986, and public and political resistance immediately became a significant obstacle. An anti-
nuclear candidate, Mikami Takao, was elected to the House of Councillors in 1989, and 
Tsuchida Hiroshi, whose views on reprocessing were cautious to moderate (at best), beat the 
existing head of the village, Furukawa Isematsu, in the December 1989 election. Because of the 
degree of controversy, the 1991Aomori prefecture governorship election was called the 
‘election of the nuclear fuel cycle’ within the community (Kamata, 2011). Despite the 
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heightened polemic, in line with peripheralisation theory, the pro-nuclear candidate, Kimura 
Masaya, was elected. 
Since then, the financial security of Rokkasho village—and its dependence on the 
nuclear industry—has expanded dramatically, with a staggering amount of financial support 
under the Three Power Laws. In addition, the Fixed Asset Tax from nuclear fuel facilities has 
accelerated financial prosperity in the village. According to calculations by Rokkasho village 
(2016) itself, the total amount of support reached approximately ¥5.5 billion ($49.3 million) 
and ¥22.23 billion ($200 million) respectively from 1987 to 2000. As Shimizu (1992) 
emphasised, ‘the weight of support by national and local government are unimaginably 
effective.’ Based on this support, the average annual income of residents was recorded as about 
¥15 million ($134,500) in 2017, making them as the richest region in Japan, whereas they were 
the poorest village in 1970 (Kahoku News, 2017).  
At present, Rokkasho village is one of the few regions within Japan to steadfastly 
promote nuclear power, even after the Fukushima accident. The anti-nuclear movement of the 
1980s and 1990s has evaporated. In addition to the initial three facilities, storage for high level 
nuclear waste and a MOX fuel manufacturer were located in the village in 1995 and 2010, 
respectively. Notwithstanding the accumulative risk by siting multiple nuclear facilities so close 
together, and historical anti-nuclear demonstrations, local people tend to vote for pro-nuclear 
candidates in local elections (Matsuoka, 2016). An interview with a local resident encapsulates 
the fatalistic aspects of community thinking: 
 
Of course, risks remain regarding the facility. Nevertheless, there are no other choices. 
The opposition could not guarantee our everyday life. (Itoh, 2016: 12) 
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Funabashi et al. (2012: 105-106) interpreted this relationship as social or mutual 
interdependency between the centre and local geographies of Japan: Rokkasho is dependent on 
flows of capital, labour, and knowledge from the centre, but the centre is dependent on 
Rokkasho for handling the backend and more dangerous components of the country’s nuclear 
fuel cycle.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Despite the heterogeneity of the four nuclear communities examined (across two very different 
countries and cultures) and nuclear technology involved (reactors, fuel storage and processing, 
waste storage), there is a striking commonality among our cases. All saw strong forms of 
peripheralisation at work, and all show the often hidden socio-political (and at times economic) 
forces behind nuclear power at the community level. As Table 5 summarizes, all see at least 
four of the five attributes of peripheralisation as “highly likely” or “likely.” This confirms that 
peripheralisation is both a perpetual and destructive force. 
 
Table 5: Qualitative summary of social peripheralisation across the four cases  
 Korea Japan 
 Ulju  Gyeongju  Futaba Rokkasho  
Geographical 
remoteness 
Moderate Unlikely Likely Likely 
Economic 
Marginality 
Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely 
Environmental 
Degradedness 
Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely 
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Political 
Powerlessness 
Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely 
Cultural 
acceptance 
Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely Highly Likely 
Source: Author 
 
The role of communities in these processes of peripheralisation is neither impartial, static, nor 
simple. Whereas Scalise (2015) paints a picture of nuclear power operators pitted against local 
actors and activists in places such as Japan, our results challenge this view, giving it more 
nuance and depth. Some communities can come to adopt and embrace nuclear facilities for the 
job security and stability they bring. This suggests that narratives centred on how nuclear power 
leads inevitably to local feelings of isolation, loss of agency, and community impotency do not 
always hold true, a finding reiterated by Venables et al. (2009) in their examination of the 
United Kingdom. Local nuclear-based economies in Japan and South Korea do depend 
financially on support from governments and utilities, but they come to actively invite such 
involvement and dependence. Futaba’s request for an additional nuclear power plant in 1991 
might be an example of this argument, as is Rokkasho’s request for a high-level waste facility 
in 1995 and MOX facility in 2010. The Ulju district in South Korea is also expected to host 
three additional reactors by 2022, and Gyeongju will be hosting additional waste storage casks 
by 2024. As such, whilst the initial siting of a facility might be interpreted as one-sided and 
undemocratic, nuclear activities become societally embedded, with a majority of community 
members coming to show a fairly homogenous feeling toward nuclear energy and its facilities. 
Peripheralisation suggests a deeper dynamic by which pro-nuclear attitudes become “locked in” 
socially and culturally.  
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 These socio-political undercurrents to nuclear power do point the way towards fruitful 
future research. Apart from the UK (examined by Blowers) and Japan and South Korea 
(examined here), in what other countries does nuclear peripheralisation occur? Can it occur 
with other energy technologies, especially capital intensive ones such as hydropower or large-
scale coal and natural gas infrastructure, or even wind and solar energy projects? Does it 
happen in other non-energy industries, or is it unique to the energy sector? Are other nations 
resistant to it beyond Finland and Sweden? Even more critically, what policy mechanisms can 
prevent peripheralisation from occurring, and once it does occur, what mechanisms can undo 
it? 
 For in essence, peripheralisation suggests that nuclear facilities in Japan and South Korea 
will invariably migrate to countries and communities that lack the political, social, and 
economic strength to oppose them. It reminds us that the future of nuclear energy may depend 
as much on community dynamics, subnational struggles, and contests over local power relations 
as it does national political instruments and transnational flows of capital and technology.  
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